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CORPORATIONS - CLOSE CORPORATIONS - METHODS OF RETAINING OwNERSHIP OF STOCK IN SURVIVING STOCKHOLDERS WHEN ONE
STOCKHOLDER Drns - The close corporation 1 is generally formed by
a small group. who take an active part in the business and whose participation is essential to the successful operation of the venture. Thus, a
partnership may decide that the corporate form will more effectively
protect the interests of its members, or a small number of people interested in the same enterprise may incorporate in order to limit their
individual liability in the common endeavor. Whatever the reason
for the use of the corporate entity, the active participation of each stockholder is probably of vital importance to the financial welfare of all.
To such a group the death of a stockholder is a catastrophe of the
greatest magnitude. Not only do the surviving stockholders lose the
effort and skill of the deceased in carrying out his share of the duties
connected with the venture, but the corporation's very existence is
threatened by the possibility that the stock will fall into the hands of
someone with little interest in, if not actual hostility to, the corporation and its management. How can the business be managed successfully when the members of the deceased's family or his legatees, who
know nothing of the problems of the business, must be accepted as principal stockholders and paid dividends although they contribute nothing
to the success of the enterprise? It is the purpose of this comment to
suggest an answer to the problem presented by pointing out several
possible methods by which the shares of a deceased stockholder can
be retained by those surviving. The allied problem of preventing the
stockholder from alienating his stock to a stranger during his life will
be considered only incidentally.

1 "A corporation in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families,
and wherein it is not at .all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling." SHUMAKER,
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY, 3d ed., 186 (1940). In England the phrase "close
corporation" has a different meaning. The distinction is pointed out in Brooks v.
Willcuts, (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 270 at 273. Cf. Detroit Trust Co. v.
The Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 at 30, 55 S. Ct. 31 (1934).
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I.

The :first method to suggest itself is a contract between the stockholders of the corporation by which each covenants not to alienate his
stock interest without giving an opportunity to purchase to the remaining shareholders, and further covenants that on his death his personal
representative will give the surviving stockholders an immediate option
to purchase at a stated price or at a valuation by a method previously
agreed upon. Such a contract could be written into the share certificates
or corporate charter and the effects of such procedure will be discussed
in section 3, infra. For present purposes the contract will be assumed to
take the form of a separate instrument. Under such an agreement the
individual stockholder or his personal representative is obligated to
give his fellow stockholders the first opportunity to acquire his interest
whenever he parts with it, whether voluntarily or otherwise. The
validity of such contracts has been upheld,2 but their ineffectiveness as
a plan of retaining control is obvious. It is apparent that if the stockholder, or his personal representative after his death, should transfer
his stock to a bona :fide purchaser the whole scheme would be ruined. 3
An action at law for damages would be available for the breach of
covenant, but the purpose of the contract, the retention of control, would
be thwarted. Money damages will not prevent the stock from being
held by outsiders, nor will it adequately compensate the surviving
shareholders for the damage done.4 In fact, it is probable that no appreciable damage could be shown; the harm is too intangible to admit of
proof in a court of law.11
If the covenants of the contract are strictly carried out there is
still the possibility that the optionees will not have the cash available at
the time to take advantage of their opportunity to purchase. In such a
contingency the plan breaks down completely. To avoid this event life
2

Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (1930);
Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N. E. (2d) 207 (1938). In Empire Trust
Co. v. Kurrus, 226 App. Div. 554, 235 N. Y. S. 410 (1929), it was held that a
provision in a stockholders' agreement that upon the death of any stockholder his
stock should be offered to the other stockholders at a price to be fixed in a specified
manner required the deceased stockholder's executor to make an offer to the remaining
stockholders promptly on the death of the deceased. See also RoLLISON, WILLS, § 190
(1939) and cases cited.
3
In re Consolidated Factors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 561.
4- New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 ( 1894);
12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATioNs, perm. ed. § 5457 (1932).
6
Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N. E. 801 (1930); New England
Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 (1894); Cushman v. Thayer
Manufacturing Jewelry Co., 76 N. Y. 365 (1879); Weiland v. Hogan, 177 Mich.
626, 143 N. W. 599 (1913).
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insurance is a possible answer, provided the opportunity to purchase
comes at the death of the shareholder. There is no doubt that one stockholder irr a close corporation has an insurable interest 6 in the lives of
his associate stockholders, because the death of one of them will probably cause a loss to the survivors through the introduction of outsiders
into the management of the business. 7 Therefore each stockholder could
insure the lives of each of the others, with himself as beneficiary, in an
amount that would pay for that stockholder's proportionate part e5f any
one of the other stockholder's interests in the business. Such a scheme is
complicated in nature but the actual computation is not too difficult. 8
The chief objection is that insurance of this type would be expensive.
Moreover, the opportunity to purchase may come during the insured's
lifetime, in which case the insurance would not be available.
A variation of this method as a means of retaining corporate control
is by a contract between the stockholders and the corporation giving the
latter an option to purchase the stock before it is offered for sale to outsiders. The special problems here, in addition to the ones already discussed, involve corporate powers. The contract is void if the corporation is not authorized to purchase its own stock.9 Even if it is so empowered there may be a limitation, either by statute 10 or judicial decision 11 that such purchases can only be made "out of" surplus. This
type of restriction may not only make the contract quite ineffective if
no surplus is on hand,12 but may void it entirely if the contract involves
a covenant to purchase instead of a mere option to do so. When the
only consideration for the stockholder's promise to sell is the covenant
of the corporation to buy, the latter's promise would be illusory be5 Insurable interest has been described by Vance as existing whenever the relation
between the assured and insured, whether by blood, marriage, or commercial intercourse, is such that the assured has a reasonable expectation of deriving benefit
from the continuation of the life insured, or of suffering detriment or incurring liability through its termination. VANCE, INSURANCE 154 (1930).
7 Phillips, "Life Insurance Trusts: A Recapitulation for the Draftsman," 81 UNiv.
PA. L. REv. 284, 408 at 409-410 (1933); Fleming v. Fleming,_ 194 Iowa 71, 174
N. W. 946, 180 N. W. 296, 184 N. W. 296 (1921).
8 See 1 C. C.H., TRUST AND ESTATE LAW SERVICE, § 9014.
9 Steele v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mutual Tel. Assn., 95 Kan. 580, 148 P. 661
(1915); State ex rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244 P. 261
(1926); Mancina v. Patrizi, 87 Cal. App. 435, 262 P. 375 (1927).
10 In re O'Gara & Maguire, (D. C. N. J. 1919) 259 F. 935; Greater New
York Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 483
(1940).
.
11 Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 35 A. 763 (1896).
12 Greater New York Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1940). Although a monetary consideration made the contract
binding in this case, the court said a lack of surplus at the time the stock was offered
to the corporation would be a defence to any action to enforce it.
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cause only possible of performance when a surplus exists, a condition
within the control of the corporation.13 Of course, if the corporation has
only an option to purchase, the stockholder cannot compel it to take the
stock. 14
2.

Another method for retaining control of the close corporation is a
contract between the stockholders, and perhaps the corporation,
whereby each stockholder agrees to bequeath his stock by will either
to the other stockholders or to the corporation itself 15 on condition that
the legatee or legatees pay its value or an agreed sum to the deceased's
estate. A contract to make a will is controlled by the same principles
and is enforceable as other contracts.16 Moreover, such a conditional
bequest is undoubtedly valid. 11 The disadvantage of the whole plan is
that it is relatively ineffective. It is objectionable for the same reasons
noted in section r, supra: lack of effective enforcement, possible inability of the legatee to comply with the condition, and lack of power or
surplus on the part of the corporation. There is the further danger
that the stockholder will alienate the stock during his life, or that he
will change his will or perhaps not make the bequest at all.

3.
The objections encountered so far are principally of two kinds:
the danger that the rights of a bona fide purchaser may intervene, and
the troublesome contingency that money may not be available to take
advantage of the option. The first problem can be eliminated through
the use of another device for retaining corporate control. It has generally been held to be a valid restraint on alienation for a corporation
to require its stockholders to give the corporation or the other stockholders an option to purchase before offering the stock for sale to
strangers. 18 Such limitations are usually stated in the charter or the
18 l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 133 (1936); Topken, Loring & Schwartz
v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928).
14 Whiton v. Batchelder & Lincoln Corp., 179 Mass. 169, 60 N. E. 483 (1901).
15 If the corporation has the power to purchase its own stock; see note 9, supra.
16 RoLLISON, WILLS, § 188 (1939); Jefferson v. Simpson, 83 W. Va. 274, 98
S. E. 212 (1919).
17 ROLLISON, WILLS, § 197 (1939). There would seem to be no ground of
public policy prohibiting such a conditional bequest. In essence, it is a bequest of an
option to purchase.
18 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 5453 (1932), and
cases cited. For a general discussion of the validity of corporate restrictions upon the
transferability of shares of stock, see 42 HARV. L. REv. 555 (1929). See also annotations in 65 A. L. R. l 159 (1930) and 66 A. L. R. II82 (1930); 30 MicH. L. REv.
766 (1932).
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by-laws 19 and are enforceable even against a purchaser for value if
the restriction is printed on the stock certificate.20
If the limitation on transfer is in broad enough terms, or if it has
specific provisions in relation thereto, on the death of the stockholder
his personal representative would be obliged to extend the option to
the corporation or the other stockholders, as the agreement might provide. Legal title to the stock would be in the executor or administrator
of the deceased stockholder's estate but he would be limited, in disposing of it, to the restriction imposed. Yet if the deceased has bequeathed the stock to a stranger, it has been held that the restriction is
not applicable and the legatee takes free of the option.21 It is doubtful
whether many courts would follow this holding, especially if the corporate restriction expressly provides for such a situation. To be safe,
however, it would be advisable to provide for this contingency by an
agreement between the stockholders to supplement the corporate restriction. Such a contract would be binding on the legatees of the
deceased stockholder.22 The problem of having sufficient cash to take
advantage of the option is still present under this scheme, but otherwise it presents an effective and inexpensive method of controlling the
ownership of the stock.

4.
The most complicated and expensive plan for solving the control
problem, yet probably the most effective in that it has none of the
troublesome objections already considered, involves the use of the life
insurance trust.23 In simplified form this method is as follows: Each
12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., §§ 5453, 5454 (1932).
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 (1894);
Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Manegold, 201 Wis. 154, 229 N. W. 544 (1930). Section 15
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides: "There shall be no lien in favor of a
corporation upon the shares represented by a certificate issued by such corporation and
there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so represented by virtue of any
by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless the right of the corporation to such
lien or the restriction is stated upon the certificate."
21 Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 79 N. Y. S. 947 (1903). It should
be noted that the paragraph in the corporation articles involved in this case did not
provide for the situation in which the stockholder bequeathed his interest to a stranger:
"No member of the association, nor his executors, administrators, or other legal representatives, shall sell or transfer any of the capital stock of the association held by him
or them, without first offering the same for sale to the association, or, if it decline the
offer, to a member thereof. . ••"
22 See cases cited in note 2, supra. Cf. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v.
Pathe Film Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 850.
28 For an extended discussion of the life insurance trust, see ScuLLY and GANsE,
BusINEss LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS (1930). See also Phillips, "Life Insurance Trusts:
A Recapitulation for the Draftsman," 81 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 284, 408 (1933). For
forms of life insurance trust agreements see 9 NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FoRMs,
§ 9.109 (1936); l C. C.H., TRUSTS AND EsTATE LAw SERVICE, 1f 92n et seq.
19

20
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shareholder obtains a life insurance policy on the life of each of the
other stockholders in an amount that is sufficient to pay for the policyholder's proportionate share of the other stockholder's stock interest,
and a designated trustee is named as the beneficiary of the policy. The
trust agreement provides that on the death of a stockholder, the
trustee will pay the proceeds of the policy to the deceased's estate and
will transfer the stock to the corporation or to the other stockholders.
The stock is deposited with the trustee along with the policies of insurance and thus the stockholders are prevented from selling their
stock to a bona fide purchaser in contravention of their agreement.
Under this device, the restraint on the alienation of the stock is effective; the money is available to pay the estate on the deceased stockholder's death; the incidents of ownership· such as voting and dividend
rights are retained by each shareholder; and disputes as to fair selling
price are avoided by providing a specific method of value determination or a stated sale price in the agreement.
The legality of such an insurance trust is now clearly settled}!'
As it was at first used, the corporation took out the policy of insurance
and the question arose whether it had an insurable interest in the lives
of its stockholders. The courts have not agreed on this question 2 '
although the trend is toward the validity of such a scheme, especially if
the stockholder is actually taking part in the business.26 It has already
24 Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N. W. 367 (1940);
Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 A. 488 (1903); Coe v. Winchester, 43 Ariz.
500, 33 P. (2d) 286 (1934); Greater New York Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258
App. Div. 649, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1940). In the Fitzsimmons case it was held
(syllabus): "An agreement among all the stockholders of a private trading corporation
that in the event of the death of any one or more of the parties, the remaining stockholders shall have the option to purchase and acquire the stock of the deceased party at
its book value, is not illegal, against public policy, or an improper restraint on alienation." In syllabus I I to the Coe case, supra, it is said: "Contract providing that each
partner should subscribe to life insurance and pay for it from partnership assets and,
on death of one, survivor should take over other's interest in business and wife or
heirs of deceased should receive insurance, held valid as executory agreement and not
invalid as testamentary disposition .••."
25 ln Tate v. Commercial Bldg. Assn., 97 Va. 74, 33 S. E. 382 (1899), it was
held that a corporation did not have an insurable interest in one of its stockholders.
However, the stockholder apparently was not actively engaged in the management
of the business. Cf. Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E.
299 (1912), where it was held (syllabus 2): "Where a person is the owner of a large
portion of the stock of a corporation, and by reason of his skill and experience he is
largely relied upon to make the business of the corporation a success • . . such facts
disclose an insurable interest in the corporation."
26 Phillips, "Life Insurance Trusts: A Recapitulation for the Draftsman," 8 1
UNiv. PA. L. REv. 284, 408 at 409 (1933); Wellhouse v. United Paper Co., (C. C.
A. 5th, 1929) 29 F. (2d) 886.

1200

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

been pointed out that one stockholder in a close corporation has an insurable interest in the lives of the other stockholders because of their
value to the enterprise.2 7 Therefore, the safer method, unless the matter
is clear in the particular jurisdiction, is for each stockholder to take
out the policies on the lives of his co-stockholders with a trustee as
beneficiary.
There are other reasons why a trustee should be used in connection
with the life insurance method. The right of the corporation to carry
life insurance on its stockholders and pay the premiums out of corporate
funds may be questioned. It would seem that inasmuch as the corporation is merely protecting itself against a known possible loss it should
have the same power to pay the premiums as it does in the case of fire
insurance. Yet, because the value to the corporation of any one stockholder is largely problematical, there is always the possibility that a
creditor might object to this use of corporate funds. The stockholder
could not object because he joins in the agreement. Further, although
by the great weight of authority a corporation has the right to buy its
own stock,28 if that right does not exist the corporation may be prevented from acting directly.20
The primary objection to the use of insurance, whether taken out
by the corporation or by the stockholders themselves, is the great expense involved. Necessarily, if the stock has great value, and if the
stockholders are middle-aged when the plan is put into effect, the cost
of the life insurance will be correspondingly large. Whether the value
to be gained by continuity of management is commensurate with the
cost of the life insurance is, of course, a question that can be answered
only on the basis of the particular facts involved in each case.
Another problem, and one that cuts across any plan that is adopted,
is that of minimizing taxation.80 It should be noted that the $40,000
exemption in the federal estate tax 81 for life insurance on the decedent's life payable to named beneficiaries may have some bearing on
the question. Recent decisions 32 of the Board of Tax Appeals have
See note 7, supra.
6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 2848 (1931), and
cases cited.
29 See note 9, supra.
so For a discussion of the tax problems in life insurance trusts, see Paul, "Life
Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1939).
81 Internal Revenue Code, § 302 (g), 53 Stat. L. 122 (1<>39), 26 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 8u(g); Treas. Reg. So, art. 25 (1937).
82 Dobrzensl'Y v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 305 (1936); Estate of John T.
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. l (1938). See also Wilson v. Crooks, (D. C.
Mo. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 692; Commissioner v. Bonwit, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 87 F.
(2d) 764.
27

28
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indicated that, if named beneficiaries receiv~ the proceeds of the insurance in lieu of the decedent's interest in the firm at his death, the
decedent is benefited by having the insurance, subject to its $40,000
exemption, substituted for his interest in the corporation in computing
his gross estate. Moreover, if the stockholder retains no incidents of
ownership and the corporation pays the premiums, there will ordinarily
be no estate tax payable on the proceeds of the life insurance policies.33
However, payment of the premiums by a close corporation might conceivably be treated as indirect payments by the stockholder and subject
his estate to the federal estate tax on that ground. 3 ~

5.
There are other possible means of perpetuating corporate stock
control-the voting trust is an example-but they have highly specialized uses and will not be discussed here. Of the four methods that
have been mentioned, the first two seem inadequate to reach the de.'..
sired end. The last two appear very effective in their result although
each has a particular inherent objection that makes it undesirable in
certain situations. The advantages to accrue by the judicious use of any
one of the methods outlined can be summarized as follows: (I) control of the corporation by the existing management will be continued on
the death of one of the principal stockholders; ( 2) strangers ignorant
of, or even hostile to, the business will not gain participation in its
affairs; (3) the surviving stockholders will not be forced to earn dividends for those who may not be able to contribute to the successful
operation of the business; (4) disputes as to sale price are avoided
because of a pre-arranged plan of evaluation of the stock interest.
Reid J. Hatfield

33

Treas. Reg. So, art. 25 ( 1937).

HJd.

